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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the study of how to extend a dichotomous
partition of a universal set X into good and bad objects to an ordering
on the power set of X. We introduce a family of rules that naturally
take into account the number of good objects and the number of bad
objects, and provide axiomatic characterizations of two rules for rank-
ing sets in such a context.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the question of how a decision maker ranks sets of
objects (individuals, goods, etc.) in contexts where the a priori information
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nology (Project SEJ2006-11510 and Juan de la Cierva program) and by Junta de Castilla
y León (Project VA040A05).
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he has about them is dichotomous in the sense that: (i) the decision maker
partitions the set of all objects into good and bad items, and (ii) the
said partition is the only information he uses in order to evaluate sets. In
other words, degrees of goodness or badness are ignored and thus, only two
indi¤erence classes are considered. Situations where such a ranking can be of
use include matching, the choice of assemblies, the election of new committee
members, group identication and coalition formation, among others.
Barberà et al. (2001), Dimitrov et al. (2007), Kasher and Rubinstein
(1997), or Samet and Schmeidler (2003), for instance, study society forma-
tion problems in which the distinction is between candidates who qualify for
membership on the basis of the opinion of some founder or member of the
society, and those who do not merit such a qualication. Dichotomy in this
context would be especially meaningful if qualication for membership were
based on a certain religious principle or political ideology. It would also be
natural if societal decisions were settled by vote and the voters had only
to decide for or against, as in Barberà et al. (2001). In other cases, the
members of the society have to decide who is entitled to perform a certain
activity within the group, such as driving a car or teaching at the university.
Analogously, we might consider college admission problems, where the good
(bad) objects might be all those students that do (do not) full a certain
academic requirement.
The objects over which the dichotomous partition is made need not nec-
essarily be people, however. A certain religious doctrine might also serve as
the criterion by which to partition a set of norms into good and bad. Sim-
ilarly, one might consider the mix of day/night shifts allocated to a worker
over a certain period of time, or whether the answers of a participant in
a test or TV quiz are right or wrong. Finally, Bogomolnaia et al. (2005)
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propose di¤erent examples to analyze allocation mechanisms for problems in
which agents partition potential lottery outcomes dichotomously into good
outcomes and bad ones.
At this point it is important, in any case, to notice that the specication
of good and bad objects in most of these contexts implies homogeneity and
full substitutability of the objects within a particular group.
Given such a dichotomous setting (in which each object is either good or
bad), the specic question we ask is the following: how can one meaningfully
extend this rudimentary information about preferences over single objects to
an ordering on their power set? We answer this question by introducing three
core axioms that naturally dene a family of rules for ranking sets in this
context and by presenting axiomatic characterizations of two di¤erent rules
that belong to the dened family. Each of these rules takes into account the
number of good objects and the number of bad objects in the corresponding
sets under comparison; they di¤er in the way in which these two numbers
are combined.
Moreover, each rule induces a unique separable preference relation over
the set of all groups of objects. That is, given an arbitrary set of objects, the
addition of a good object to this set always results in a higher ranked set,
while the addition of a bad object results in a lower ranked set. Clearly then,
the set of all good objects and the set of all bad objects, respectively, con-
stitute the top and the bottom of the induced preference relations. Bearing
this in mind, our results can be interpreted as an axiomatic characterization
of two subclasses of the class of separable preferences, the latter being com-
monly used as a primitive in the analysis of voting situations (cf. Barberà
et al. (1991), Berga et al. (2004), Ju (2003, 2005)) and coalition formation
games (cf. Burani and Zwicker (2003), Dimitrov et al. (2006)).
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On the other hand, the results can be also seen as a contribution to the
problem of ranking sets of objects in the context of choice under complete
uncertainty1 for the special case in which outcomes are compared dichoto-
mously as in Bogomolnaia et al. (2005).
2 Basic setup
We denote by X the nonempty nite set of objects. These objects may be
candidates considered for membership in a club, for example, or possible
coalition partners, bills under legislative consideration, etc. We assume that
each object is either good or bad, and that there is at least one good object
and at least one bad object (cf. Fishburn (1992)). We denote by G the set
of all good objects in X; the set of all bad objects is X nG.
The set of all subsets of X, including the empty set, will be denoted by
X . The elements of X are the (alternative) groups of objects an agent may
be confronted with. The question now arises of how this agent ranks sets
consisting of good and bad elements based on his partition (G;X nG) of
X. Consequently, the problem to be analyzed is how to establish a reexive,
transitive and complete binary relation % on X . For all C;D 2 X , C % D
is to be interpreted as C is at least as good as D. The asymmetric and
symmetric factors of % will be denoted by  (is better than) and  (is
as good as), respectively. Finally, we denote by P the set of all reexive,
transitive and complete binary relations on X .
1 In the problems of choice under complete uncertainty, or ignorance, the probabilities
of the outcomes generated by each action are not taken into account. Therefore, each
individual decision is simply described by the set of outcomes it generates (see Barberà et
al. (2004) for motivation and a survey of this approach).
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3 A family of rules
We start our analysis by introducing the following axioms:
Local monotonicity towards good elements (LM): There exists A 2 X n fXg
such that A [ fxg  A for some x 2 G n A.
Local aversion towards bad elements (LA): There exists A 2 X n fXg such
that A [ fxg  A for some x 2 X n (A [G).
Independence (IND): For all A;B 2 X , and all x 2 X n A, y 2 X n B with
x 2 G, y 2 G, A % B , A [ fxg % B [ fyg.
Axiom LM states that we can always nd some set, A, that can be im-
proved by adding some good new element to it. This is a rather weak require-
ment if one assumes that good objects are valuable to the decision maker.
Especially, the axiom becomes very plausible if one thinks of A as the empty
set and x as any good element.
The second axiom, LA, expresses the idea that there is some situation
in which the decision maker fears the addition of more bad elements. In
particular, AV says that there exist some set, A, and some bad element not
belonging to A, such that the former is worsened by the addition of the latter.
Finally, IND illustrates the e¤ect of adding (or dropping) two elements
that are of the same type in the sense that they are either both good or
both bad. The axiom, which says that the original ranking between any two
sets of objects is preserved under such a modication, is an adaptation to
our context of other similar axioms often found in the literature on ranking
sets (cf. Kannai and Peleg (1984) or Pattanaik and Xu (1990) among many
others).
In fact, IND captures a double assumption: on the one hand it clearly
proposes some idea of separability. On the other hand, given that it applies to
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every pair of elements, x and y, belonging to the same category, it illustrates,
albeit less explicitly, our second main assumption about the preferences over
objects; namely, that no degrees of goodness or badness are considered.2
As it turns out, these three axioms generate a family of rules that are
based on two numbers only - the number of good elements and the number
of bad elements, where the former are positively weighted and the latter are
negatively weighted.
Theorem 1 Let %2 P satisfy IND, LM, and LA. Then, for all A;B 2 X ,
(1) (jA \Gj > jB \Gj and jA nGj < jB nGj) implies A  B,
(2) (jA \Gj  jB \Gj and jA nGj  jB nGj) implies A % B.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
4 Characterization results
We now present axiomatic characterizations of two rules that belong to the
above described family of rules.
The rst rule turns out to result from the interplay of the core axioms in-
troduced in the previous section and a robustness axiom that we are about to
introduce. The idea behind this axiom works as follows. Imagine a situation
in which a set of elements, A, consists only of a proper subset of bad elements
from another set, B, which, as well as the bad elements, might also contain
good ones. Imagine also that the decision maker, nevertheless, declares a
strict preference for A over B. We interpret this premise as revealing that
2 The double dimension of IND might be made more explicit by splitting it into two
di¤erent conditions: (1) For all x 2 X nA, y 2 X nB with x 2 G, y 2 G, fxg  fyg; (2)
For all A;B 2 X , and all x 2 XnA, y 2 XnB with fxg  fyg, A % B , A[fxg % B[fyg.
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the decision maker is insensitive to the presence of good elements in B, and
that what prevails is the fact that A contains fewer bad elements. In such a
situation, therefore, we require that the decision-maker remains insensitive
when a new element is added to the set B in the sense that the corresponding
strict preference is preserved.
Robustness (ROB): For all A;B 2 X with A  (B nG) and for all x 2 X,
A  B ) A  B [ fxg.
As shown in our next theorem, the addition of ROB to IND, LM, and
LA results in the characterization of the bad-elements-priority rule %bp2 P,
which was rst dened in Dimitrov at al. (2003)3:
For all A;B 2 X ,
A %bp B i¤
8>><>>:
jA nGj < jB nGj ,
or
jA nGj = jB nGj and jA \Gj  jB \Gj :
Theorem 2 Let %2 P. Then % satises IND, LM, LA, and ROB if and
only if %=%bp.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
In order to demonstrate the independence of the axioms used for the
characterization of %bp, consider the following examples:
:(IND): Let jXj  3. For all A;B 2 X , let % be dened as follows: (1) if
jAj  3 and jBj  3, then A  B, (2) if jAj < 3 and jBj  3, then A  B,
(3) if jAj < 3 and jBj < 3, then %=%bp.
:(LM): For all A;B 2 X , A % B i¤ jA nGj  jB nGj.
3 The cited paper does not contain a suitable axiomatic characterization of the pro-
posed rule.
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:(LA): For all A;B 2 X , A % B i¤ (1) jA nGj > jB nGj, or (2) jA nGj =
jB nGj and jA \Gj  jB \Gj.
:(ROB): For all A;B 2 X , A % B i¤ (1) jA \Gj > jB \Gj, or (2) jA \Gj =
jB \Gj and jA nGj  jB nGj.
The second rule from the family of rules described in the previous section
is of an additive nature and can be introduced by means of the following
axiom.
Local dichotomy (LD): There exists A 2 X;nfXg such that Anfxg  A[fyg
for some x 2 A \G and some y 2 X n (A [G).
Condition LD is a much weaker version of a dichotomy axiom used in
Dimitrov et al. (2004). LD states that there exist some set, A, a good
element x, and a bad element y, such that the decision maker considers the
non-inclusion of the good element x in A and the inclusion of the bad element
y in A to be indi¤erent. In other words, the axiom displays a local perfect
substitution between the presence of a good elementand the absence of
a bad elementfor some A 2 X; n fXg, x 2 A and y 2 X n A .
We are now ready to present the characterization of the di¤erence rule,
%d2 P, dened as follows4:
For all A;B 2 X ,
A %d B i¤ jA \Gj   jA nGj  jB \Gj   jB nGj :
Theorem 3 Let %2 P. Then % satises IND, LM, and LD if and only if
%=%d.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
4 See Dimitrov et al. (2004) for a di¤erent characterization of the same rule.
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In order to check the independence of the axioms used for the character-
ization of %d, the reader may consider the following examples:
:(IND): Let X = fx; yg, G = fxg, and consider the following ranking on
X : ;  fx; yg  fxg  fyg.
:(LM): For all A;B 2 X , A  B.
:(LD): For all A;B 2 X , A % B i¤ jAj  jBj.
As we show in Lemma 4 in the appendix, %2 P satises axioms IND,
LM, and LD if and only if % satises IND, LA, and LD. Thus, we have the
following alternative characterization of the di¤erence rule.
Theorem 4 Let %2 P. Then % satises IND, LA, and LD if and only if
%=%d.
To check the independence of the above three axioms characterizing %d,
we may take the following examples:
:(IND): Let X = fx; yg, G = fxg, and consider the following ranking on
X : ;  fx; yg  fyg  fxg.
:(LA): For all A;B 2 X , A  B.
:(LD): For all A;B 2 X , A % B i¤ jAj  jBj.
5 Concluding remarks
Among the di¤erent ways in which the decision maker may evaluate sets of
objects containing both good and bad elements, we have presented two plau-
sible solutions derived from a common axiomatic basis. These core axioms
are Independence (IND), Local monotonicity towards good elements (LM),
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and Local aversion towards bad elements (LA), and they determine a whole
family of rules. Then, imposing the Robustness axiom (ROB) we obtain
a characterization of the bad-elements-priority rule. Finally, if, instead of
(ROB), we use Local dichotomy (LD) and either (LM) and (IND), or (LA)
and (IND), then an additive rule that maximizes the di¤erence between the
number of good and bad elements is obtained.
Our model performs an axiomatic analysis based on a very elementary
partition of the set of objects into good and bad items. A natural step for-
ward in this research is to advance in dening the structure of the decision
makers information about the alternatives. For instance, the simple infor-
mation structure described in this paper could be enriched by embedding a
similarity relation (cf. Pattanaik and Xu (2000)) on the sets of good and bad
objects. This would allow discrimination among di¤erent subgroups of good
(bad) objects and would also enable consideration of extensions to the rules
characterized here.
6 Appendix
This section collects the proofs of all theorems that appear in the text. In
what follows, for all S  X and all k 2 f1; : : : ; jSjg, we denote by (S)k any
subset of S with k elements.
We will rst prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let %2 P satisfy IND and LM. Then B [ E  B for all B 2 X
and all E  (G nB) n f;g.
Proof of Lemma 1. Take %2 P as above and let E = fe1; : : : ; eng. By
LM, there exists A 2 X n fXg such that A [ fxg  A for some x 2 G n A.
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Repeated application of IND implies that fxg  ; for some x 2 G n A. By
reexivity, ;  ; and by IND, fxg  fe1g. Thus, by transitivity, fe1g  ;.
Now, by applying IND, B [ fe1g  B. Repeating the same argument with
e2 we obtain B [ fe1; e2g  B [ fe1g, and by the same argument repeated
(n  2)-times and transitivity, we get B [ E  B.
Lemma 2 Let %2 P satisfy IND and LA. Then B [ E  B for all B 2 X
and all E  (X n (B [G)) n f;g.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 except
that LA is applied instead of LM.
Theorem 1 Let %2 P satisfy IND, LM, and LA. Then, for all A;B 2 X ,
(1) (jA \Gj > jB \Gj and jA nGj < jB nGj) implies A  B,
(2) (jA \Gj  jB \Gj and jA nGj  jB nGj) implies A % B.
Proof of Theorem 1. (1) Let jA \Gj > jB \Gj and jA nGj < jB nGj.
By reexivity, ;  ;. If jB \Gj = 0 (i.e., B \ G = ;), A \ G  ; follows
from Lemma 1 with A \ G in the role of E, i.e., we have A \ G  B \ G
in this case. If jB \Gj = s > 0, the application of IND s-times results in
(A \G)s  B \ G. By Lemma 1, with (A \G) n (A \G)s in the role of E,
we have A \G  (A \G)s. This, by transitivity, results in A \G  B \G.
Therefore, whether B \G 6= ; or B \G = ;, we have that A \G  B \G.
By Lemma 2 and jB nGj > 0 (i.e., B n G 6= ;), we have B \ G  B.
If A n G = ;, we have by transitivity that A  B. Suppose now that
jA nGj = v. Starting from A \ G  B \ G and applying v-times IND, we
obtain A  (B \G)[ (B nG)v. By Lemma 2, with (B nG)n (B nG)v in the
role of E, (B \G) [ (B nG)v  B. By transitivity, A  B.
(2) The case in which jA \Gj > jB \Gj and jA nGj < jB nGj was
proved in the previous paragraph. Thus, we will distinguish the three re-
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maining possible cases:
(2.1) jA \Gj > jB \Gj and jA nGj = jB nGj,
(2.2) jA \Gj = jB \Gj and jA nGj < jB nGj, and
(2.3) jA \Gj = jB \Gj and jA nGj = jB nGj.
(2.1) As in the rst part of the proof, it can be proved, by using reexivity,
IND and LM, that A \G  B \G. If jA nGj = jB nGj = 0, then it follows
directly that A  B. If jA nGj = jB nGj = u > 0, by IND repeated u-times,
A  B.
(2.2) Let jA nGj = u. By reexivity, ;  ;, and applying u-times IND,
A n G  (B nG)u. By Lemma 2, with (B nG) n (B nG)u in the role of
E, (B nG)u  B n G. By transitivity, A n G  B n G. Applying IND
jA \Gj = jB \Gj-times, A  B.
(2.3) From reexivity, ;  ;, and applying IND jA \Gj = jB \Gj-times,
A \G  B \G. Again by IND applied jA nGj = jB nGj-times, A  B.
Theorem 2 Let %2 P. Then % satises IND, LM, LA, and ROB if and
only if %=%bp.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is not di¢ cult to check that %bp satises the four
axioms. Suppose now that %2 P satises IND, LM, LA, and ROB. We have
to prove that, for all A;B 2 X ,
(1) jA nGj < jB nGj implies A  B,
(2) (jA nGj = jB nGj and jA \Gj > jB \Gj) implies A  B, and
(3) (jA nGj = jB nGj and jA \Gj = jB \Gj) implies A  B.
(1) Let jA nGj = u and jB nGj = v, with v > u. By reexivity and IND
applied u-times, A nG  (B nG)u. By Lemma 2, with (B nG) n (B nG)u in
the role of E, (B nG)u  B nG. By transitivity, A nG  B nG.
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Now, let us consider the following partitions of A nG and B nG :
A nG = (A nG)1 [ (A nG)2 ;
B nG = (B nG)1 [ (B nG)2 ;
where
(A nG)1 = fx 2 A nG j x 2 B nGg ;
(A nG)2 = fx 2 A nG j x 2 X n (B nG)g ;
(B nG)1 = fx 2 B nG j x 2 A nGg = (A nG)1 ;
(B nG)2 = fx 2 B nG j x 2 X n (A [G)g :
Let (A nG)1 = a 1 ; : : : ; a u1	 = (B nG)1, (A nG)2 = a u1+1; : : : ; a u 	,
(B nG)2 = b u1+1; : : : ; b v 	. Note that, by hypothesis, (B nG)2 > (A nG)2.
Consider

b u1+1; : : : ; b
 
u
	  (B nG)2. Then  (A nG)1 [ b u1+1; : : : ; b u 	 n
(A nG)2  AnG by Theorem 1. By transitivity,  (A nG)1 [ b u1+1; : : : ; b u 	n
(A nG)2  B n G. By ROB,  (A nG)1 [ b u1+1; : : : ; b u 	 n (A nG)2  B.
Now, if A\G = ;, then A  AnG by reexivity, and by transitivity, A  B.
If A \G 6= ;, then, by Lemma 1, A  A nG, and by transitivity, A  B.
(2) LetAnG = a 1 ; : : : ; a u 	, BnG = b 1 ; : : : ; b u 	, A\G = a+1 ; : : : ; a+r 	,
andB\G = b+1 ; : : : ; b+s 	, r > s. By Theorem 1, (A nG)[a+1 ; : : : ; a+s 	  B.
By Lemma 1, A  (A nG) [ a+1 ; : : : ; a+s 	. Again by transitivity, A  B.
(3) By Theorem 1, A  B.
Theorem 3 Let %2 P. Then % satises IND, LM, and LD if and only if
%=%d.
We will rst prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3 Let %2 P satisfy IND and LD, and let A;B 2 X be such that
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B = A [ E with jE \Gj = jE nGj. Then A  B.
Proof of Lemma 3. Take %2 P as above and let E \ G = e+1 ; : : : ; e+n	,
E nG = e 1 ; : : : ; e n	.
If jE \Gj = jE nGj = 0, the lemma follows by reexivity. If jE \Gj =
jE nGj > 0, we have by LD that there exists F 2 X;nfXg such that Fnfxg 
F [ fyg for some x 2 F \ G and some y 2 X n (F [G). Applying IND
repeatedly, we have ;  fx; yg for some x 2 F \G and some y 2 X n(F [G).
By reexivity, ;  ; and by IND applied twice, fx; yg  fe+1 ; e 1 g. Thus,
by transitivity, ;  fe+1 ; e 1 g. By IND, fe+2 ; e 2 g  fe+1 ; e+2 ; e 1 ; e 2 g and by
transitivity, ;  fe+1 ; e+2 ; e 1 ; e 2 g. Repeating the same argument (n 2)-times
and by transitivity, we have ;  E. Thus, by IND, A  A [ E, i.e., A  B.
Lemma 4 %2 P satises IND, LM, and LD if and only if it satises IND,
LA, and LD.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let %2 P satisfy IND, LM, and LD. We have to show
that % also satises LA. Notice rst that Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 hold. In
particular, by Lemma 1 we have that fx; yg  fxg for all x 2 X and all
y 2 G 2 X; with y 6= x. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, we have ;  fx; yg for
all G 2 X;, all x 2 G, and all y 2 X nG.
In order to prove that % satises LA, we rst prove the following Claim:
fxg  fx;wg for all x 2 X, all G 2 X; n fXg and all w 2 X n G with
w 6= x. This would demonstrate that, for each G 2 X; n fXg, there exists
A 2 X n fXg such that A [ fwg  A for some w 2 X n (A [G), as required
by LA. In particular, A could be any singleton included in G.
Consider rst the case in which jXj = 2 and let X = fx;wg with w 2
X n G. Since G is nonempty, this means that G = fxg. Then, by Lemma
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1, fx;wg  fwg. By IND, fxg  ;. On the other hand, by Lemma 3,
;  fx;wg. Thus, by transitivity, fxg  fx;wg.
Suppose next that jXj  3, and take x;w as in the Claim. If G 6= fxg,
then there exists z 2 G, z 6= x. By Lemma 3, ;  fz; wg, and by Lemma 1
we have fz; wg  fwg. By transitivity, ;  fwg, and by IND, fxg  fx;wg.
If G = fxg, then, by Lemma 1, fx;wg  fwg. By IND, fxg  ;. On the
other hand, by Lemma 3, ;  fx;wg. Thus, by transitivity, fxg  fx;wg.
Suppose next that %2 P satises IND, LA, and LD. The proof that %
also satises LM is analagous to the above one by virtue of the fact that in
this case Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 hold.
Corollary 1 Let %2 P satisfy IND, LM, and LD. Then the statement
in Lemma 2 holds, that is, B [ E  B for all B 2 X and all E 
(X n (B [G)) n f;g.
Proof Theorem 3. It can be easily checked that %d satises the three ax-
ioms. Suppose now that %2 P satises IND, LM, and LD. We have to prove
that, for all A;B 2 X ,
(1) jA \Gj   jA nGj > jB \Gj   jB nGj implies A  B, and
(2) jA \Gj   jA nGj = jB \Gj   jB nGj implies A  B.
Let jA \Gj = r, jB \Gj = s, jA nGj = u, jB nGj = v.
(1) In this case r   u > s   v. We consider the following three possible
cases:
(1.1) r > u and s > v,
(1.2) r > u and s  v,
(1.3) r  u and s < v.
(1.1) Let r > u and s > v. By reexivity, ;  ;. By Lemma 3,
(A \G)u [ (A nG)  ;. Also by Lemma 3, (B \G)v [ (B nG)  ;.
Thus, by transitivity, (A \G)u [ (A nG)  (B \G)v [ (B nG). Given that
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r   u > s   v, by IND applied (s   v)-times (A \G)u+s v [ (A nG) 
(B \G)v+s v [ (B nG), i.e., (A \G)u+s v [ (A nG)  B. By Lemma 1,
A  (A \G)u+s v [ (A nG), and by transitivity, A  B.
(1.2) Let r > u and s  v. As in case (1.1), by reexivity, Lemma 3 and
transitivity we get (A \G)u [ (A nG)  (B \G) [ (B nG)s. By Lemma 1,
A  (A \G)u [ (A nG), and, if s < v, by Lemma 2,
(B \G) [ (B nG)s  B:
If s = v, (B \G) [ (B nG)s = B. In any case, by transitivity, A  B.
(1.3) Let r  u and s < v. As before, by reexivity, Lemma 3 and
transitivity we get (A \G) [ (A nG)r  (B \G) [ (B nG)s. Since r   u >
s   v, then u   r < v   s. Then we can apply IND (u   r)-times obtaining
(A \G) [ (A nG)r+u r  (B \G) [ (B nG)s+u r. That is, A  (B \G) [
(B nG)s+u r. By Lemma 3,
(B \G) [ (B nG)s+u r  B:
Then, by transitivity, A  B.
(2) In this case r   u = s   v. If r  u (s  v), then, as in case (1), by
reexivity, Lemma 3 and transitivity we get
(A \G)u [ (A nG)  (B \G)v [ (B nG) ;
and by IND applied (r   u)(= s  v)-times, A  B.
If r < u (s < v), then, by reexivity, Lemma 3 and transitivity we get
(A \G) [ (A nG)r  (B \G) [ (B nG)s ;
and by IND applied (u  r)(= v   s)-times, A  B.
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